

Evaluating Peacebuilding Strategies Applied by Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees In Mombasa County

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ABSTRACT

The changing nature of conflict and the emergence of new security challenges alongside a relatively underfunded global peace and security architecture has put to question the continued relevance of the strategies used in peacebuilding. The 2008 Kenya Government directive that each County should have a peacebuilding entity brought into the limelight the work of the Peacebuilding Committees in Kenya. Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have been conducting peacebuilding in the County, against the backdrop of old conflict drivers such as poverty and resource-based conflict, and emerging threats to peace such as drug trafficking and youth radicalisation. Therefore, the ability of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to foster sustainable peacebuilding in these circumstances needs to be interrogated. The objective of this study was to evaluate the strategies applied by the Sub-county peacebuilding committees in advancing sustainable peacebuilding. Conceptual framework was based on Galtung's Theory of Peacebuilding, Galtung's Theory of Structural Violence and Lederach's Conflict Transformation Theory. The study adopted a descriptive survey research design and applied both convenience and purposive sampling techniques. Data were collected through semi-structured questionnaires, key informant interview (KII) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) guides and observation checklists. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used for data analysis. The most common strategies for peacebuilding that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees used were; individual and community dialogue; community mobilisation through theatre and dance; peace *Barazas*, community walks and ad hoc meetings. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborated with a wide range of other stakeholders including; Government agencies (such as NSC), NGOs, and both local and international and religious organizations. Social media has been used as one of the peacebuilding tools employed by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. To ensure that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees foster sustainable peacebuilding, the study recommend that strategies need to gradually shift towards those that address the underlying causes of conflict in Mombasa County.

Key Words; *DynPolicy Framework; SubSustainable Peace; Sustainable Peacebuilding*

1. INTRODUCTION

Historically, local peacebuilding committees have functioned as informal spaces where villagers meet, discuss and resolve their conflicts by applying a range of traditional, bottom-up methods of peacebuilding (Mungai *et al*, 2020). These structures still function in the same manner, however, the realisation by national Governments that these entities were a viable partner in peacebuilding led to their rapid formalisation and co-option into Government peace and structures. This was the case of Kenya's Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) which originally came out of the desire to strengthen social cohesion of local communities in search for sustainable peace, but later got absorbed into the Wajir County peacebuilding agenda (Nganje, 2020). Formal peacebuilding committees are therefore local peacebuilding institutions that have been accorded Government recognition and either coopted into formal Government peace and security systems or supported to foster peacebuilding on their own. Over time, local peacebuilding committees have expanded and formed networks that are now known as the national infrastructures for peace (I4P).

In Kenya, like in other parts of Africa, local peace committees arose from the desires of local communities to respond and manage conflict amongst themselves. In many instances, as was the case of Wajir County, it was the continued conflict and the poor response by the national Government that led to the formation of an informal structure for local peacebuilding which later became a huge and formal peacebuilding and security structure after the Government took it over in 1995 (Ndegwa, 2001).

The Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) has been cited as the perfect example of a local peacebuilding entity that arose out of the community in response to recurrent violent conflict that had virtually crippled local life in Wajir County. Through persistent effort and careful inclusion of warring parties, and adoption of different voices, Wajir Peace Initiative eventually spurred a county-wide program of local peacebuilding entities that are to be found in all parts of Kenya. The growth of the local peace infrastructure in Kenya has been credited to this initiative. Local peace infrastructures can grow out of a felt need of the people affected by conflict, or out of Government policy in that direction. However, the real impact of these peacebuilding entities is still to be fully realised.

Even with about 235 formal LPCs working at the Sub-county level in Kenya, and many more informal peacebuilding infrastructures in support, the literature suggests that the country still has serious peacebuilding challenges. At the operational level, local peacebuilding structures have been judged as weak in conceptualising and executing peacebuilding strategies. At the structural level, the process of institutionalisation has threatened local agency, and introduced a top-down relationship that has disempowered the local peace committees (Githaiga, 2020). Basing their argument on the loss of control, Githaiga, citing Magotsi (2014) asserts that institutionalisation limits the authority of local level engagement thereby reducing the degree of sustainability of the intervention. Local peacebuilding structures have been affected by a lack of resources. While the Kenyan NSC seems to have placed very high expectations on the LPCs, the entities remain under resources and therefore weak in terms of operational capacity. Moreover, as Nganje (2020) suggests, these entities are most effective in the context of low-key community conflicts that can be addressed using dialogue, mediation, or other problem-solving approaches, and have no enforcement capabilities.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Mombasa County has been known to experience cyclical and often protracted conflict incidents that have negatively impacted on the peace of the County and by extension, Kenya as a whole. This conflict is prominent with regard to ethnic animosity, political violence, radicalisation, gender-based violence, and domestic terrorism (Elder *et al.*, (2014); County Government of Mombasa, (2018), Rakodi, (2000)). Despite many years and much investment by Government, Civil society and religious leaders, the cycle and long history of conflict has not been broken. The establishment of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees, as a policy response in 2008 seems to have made no difference in the County. There are several stakeholders in the peace agenda of Mombasa including; the national and county government of Mombasa, the security forces, politicians and elites, young people who are susceptible to radicalisation and militias. All these have employed different strategies and for peacebuilding that are yet to be interrogated. Secondly, how these different stakeholders interact with the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees and the factors that come into play greatly influence the peacebuilding agenda of the County and this needs to be probed. There is a clear need to interrogate the dynamics that influence the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees so as to understand the sustainable peacebuilding potential in Mombasa County.

Mombasa County poses a major peacebuilding challenge for Kenya, and the East African region. It serves as the largest port of entry for Kenya and the larger East African trading block which now includes Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These countries have set to be fully economically integrated by 2063, and Mombasa holds the key to this integration process. Mombasa is also the most popular tourist destination in the Eastern Indian Ocean coast. These two factors, in addition to the need for a peaceful and prosperous Kenya makes peacebuilding in Mombasa an important County agenda, in which local peacebuilding committees have a central role. However, even with an elaborate peace policy and County leadership in support, the effectiveness of the formal peacebuilding infrastructure in Mombasa remains unknown.

To date, the only assessment done by Onyango (2010) found that the Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were weak in terms of physical structures and equipment, a fact which severely compromised their functions. Onyango (2010) attributed this situation to the embryonic nature of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees even though they were borrowing from already working Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees from other parts of Kenya. Almost 10 years after this assessment, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have continued to expand and work in peacebuilding but with an unknown level of effectiveness. There is no credible knowledge of the challenges that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees face nor the opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding within the infrastructure. There is a need to examine the dynamics that impact upon the effectiveness of the Sub-County Peacebuilding because they are the official structures that are supposed to be driving sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa. As argued by Adan & Pkalya (2006), merely having an entity called a local peace infrastructure does not secure the peace, leave alone sustainable peace. This study interrogated the efficacy of the formal infrastructure for peace in promoting sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County, focusing on peacebuilding policy framework, strategies and operational challenges. In the process, sustainable peacebuilding opportunities were also explored.

1.2 Research Objective

Evaluate the strategies applied by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in fostering peacebuilding for sustainable peace in Mombasa County.

1.3 Research Question

Why are the strategies employed by the peacebuilding infrastructure in fostering sustainable peace efforts in Mombasa County able or unable to foster sustainable peacebuilding?

1.4 Justification of the study

1.4.1 Academic Justification

Academic interest in peacebuilding is justified by the fact that research fulfils a very important concern which is to bridge the gap between practice and the conceptualisation of peacebuilding interventions. This is important when considering the question of local level peacebuilding because the efforts of peacebuilding are supposed to percolate and make a difference at the grassroots level. When it comes to local peacebuilding committees, much emphasis has been put in the bottom-up advantage of local peacebuilding approaches as opposed top-down to the programs supported by international peacebuilding organisations. There is still a wide gap in the literature in understanding the dynamics that either link or separate these two approaches, and whether a hybrid of the two could foster sustainable peacebuilding (Neufeldt *et al* (2020).

This study set out to fill this gap by examining the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees from a policy framework perspective in order to fill this gap in the academic literature. The study further examined the peacebuilding strategies used by the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees from the angle of prescription or necessity in order to arrive at a more accurate assessment of the efficacy of these entities. By putting these two aspects of Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees assessment, the study hoped to fill this academic gap in the study of peace and conflict studies. Moreover, Paffenholz's (2021) has argued that the assumption of cause-effect problem-solving approaches to peacebuilding is now obsolete, because peacebuilding has so many moving parts that it cannot follow a linear route. Mombasa County offers an opportunity for testing some of these assumptions because old and new threats to peace have converged to make the County a peacebuilding challenge.

1.4.2 Philosophical Justification

An African proverb credited to the Somali people says that "*the best bed that a man can sleep on is peace*". The proverb reflects a community's philosophical approach to peace and likens peace to a state of tranquility, in which, even though sleep may increase a person's vulnerability, peace makes it possible for one to sleep. The analogy of the bed connotes a culture of peace in which the society cultivates a broad consensus of peace which allows hope to turn into trust. The question then becomes; can local peacebuilding foster a culture of peace? In pursuing a culture of peace through Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees, the National Government has put in place the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management which envisions a Kenyan peacebuilding architecture in which all stakeholders have an equal say in their peace through equitable participation.

A culture of peace does not assume the non-existence of conflict, but rather a consistent and sustainable way of ensuring that conflicts do not become violent by instituting mechanisms, both formal and informal that ensure that these conflicts do not escalate into violence (Ericksun, 2021). However, Bar-Tal (2009) argues that the challenge for the culture of peace is to be found in the temporary resolution of conflict through approaches like mediation and negotiation and the lack true reconciliation that changes societal view of conflict. This study attempted to view Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa as one way of building a culture for peace given the long history of conflict in the County.

1.4.3 Policy Justification

Kenya has developed and is implementing the National Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Policy of 2011. The optimistic argument in the policy document is that a multi-sectoral, multi-pronged approach to peacebuilding will somehow guarantee a peaceful nation. At the same time, Mombasa County has elaborated its policy framework for preventing and countering violent extremism, (MCAP/PCVE) based on the Kenya National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) by the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). Both policies need to be informed by credible knowledge of the efficacy of the peacebuilding infrastructure in the county. Kenya has been a beneficiary of foreign assistance in its peacebuilding efforts for a long time, starting from the UN, and the EU and from bilateral such as USAID, DfID. The interest from international benefactors comes with intended and unintended consequences, which at times distorts policy. For, example, the UN has been criticized and praised in equal measure for the intended and unintended outcomes of peacebuilding (Tschigri, 2004; Gisselquist, 2018). This also explored the perspectives of Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees regarding partnerships and how these arrangements either supported or hindered their work.

2. Strategies of Sustainable Peacebuilding and Implications for Local Peacebuilding Committees

2.1 Preventive Diplomacy

The UN has continued to champion PD in nearly all its peace missions. Nathan *et al* (2018) argue that PD makes sense from a sustainability perspective because preventive diplomacy is a form of operational conflict prevention and takes place in moments of acute crisis where the risk of large-scale violence is imminent. Using the examples of UN preventive diplomacy across the world, Nathan *et al* (2018) point out that success depends on a very good understanding of the conflict parties' perspectives on violence and non-violent courses of action. The UN has been able to use its advantage to cause de-escalation of certain conflicts that would have otherwise turned into bigger problems. Nathan *et al* (2018) provide an example of Malawi, where the UN-funded and deployed experts to support the national dialogue and in Nigeria where the UN-funded and supported the National Peace Committee and the Independent National Electoral Commission during the 2015 elections in Nigeria and in Sudan elections which contributed to the successful referendum for southern Sudan.

On the African continent, the African Union has embraced Preventive Diplomacy as a pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Preventive Diplomacy is outlined in the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 which was adopted in 2013 that builds on the achievements and challenges resulting from the implementation of the previous APSA Roadmap (2011-2013). The APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 details the AU's vision in the five strategic peace and security areas: Conflict prevention (incl. early warning and preventive diplomacy), crisis/conflict management (including African standby Force and mediation), post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, strategic security issues (such as illegal flows of Small and Light Weapons, Improvised Explosive Devices, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, disarmament, counter-terrorism, illicit financial flows as well as transnational organised crime and cybercrime) and coordination and partnerships. In addition, cross-cutting issues are covered by the Roadmap.

Kenya has had a role in the application of Preventive Diplomacy both as a domestic policy and as a regional partner in the peace discourse of East Africa and other parts of the continent as well. This section starts with a review of the conflict situation in Kenya to set the background for the application of Preventive Diplomacy as a peacebuilding strategy in the country. Much has been written on the conflict situation in Kenya and the strategies for peacebuilding that have been employed over the years. Rohweder (2015) summarises the conflict situation in Kenya as characterised by overlapping conflicts complicated by a large ethnic diversity, high levels of inter-communal violence, sexual and gender-based violence; cycles of election-related violence; and increasing numbers of terrorist attacks. The conflict dynamics that complicate Kenya's conflict situation include; politicised ethnicity, discrimination and marginalisation: corruption and impunity; the long-standing land issue and the menace of terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab who have maximised ethnicity and poor Government response to attack the country at will. Much of the literature has concentrated on conflict resolving recommendations that include addressing inequality, reforming the security sector, tackling corruption and engaging in conflict-sensitive development (Ajulu, 2002; Onguny and Gillies, 2019; Heider, 2020).

2.2 Conflict Early Warning.

The changing nature of conflict and the emergence of new security challenges alongside a relatively underfunded global peace and security architecture has put to question the continued relevance of the early warning idea. This is because the utility value of early warning information has not been proven Wulf and Deibel (2009). A pertinent question regarding early warning is; how early is early? When the conflict that ended up toppling President Mobutu is considered, then it is clear that unless acted upon in the right time, early warning information is completely useless.

The Kenya National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (NCEWERS) is a proactive conflict prevention strategy launched in late November 2010, and is designed to gather information from the public domain through crowdsourcing (SMS 108) and peace structures, such as Sub-county peacebuilding Committees. Early Warning is used to forecast and prevent violence at the community and national levels. According to the NSC, the system was instrumental in supporting the peacefully transitioning to the 2010 referendum, and the 2013 general elections through the UWIANO Platform for Peace. It has also been key in picking up the community level conflicts and advising on the formulation of sustainable interventions. The system is a domestication of the IGAD-CEWARN mechanism and is seen as a best practice in the region. This has led to the NSC hosting high-level delegations from Ethiopia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, the East Africa Community, Uganda, and South Sudan, among others. The system uses the current District Peace Committees (Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees), Peace Monitors and other relevant parties to gather crucial information from the field (NSC, 2021).

An important feature of the Kenya National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (NCEWERS) has been its attempt to be as inclusive as possible. In 2016, NSC initiated a move to include peace stakeholders within the NCEWERS which is made up of civil society, informal groups such as *chamas* (defined as an informal self-help group), youth groups, councils of elders, religious councils as well as grassroots persons to ensure that conflict early warning and early responses are effective. In keeping with the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and the recognition of the role that women have played in Kenya's peace journey, the NSC set out to ensure that the NCEWERS was fully engendered by 2016, so as to maximise on the potential of the system based on the increased role that both men and women could play in early warning (NSC, 2016). NSC further argue that the exclusion of women from early warning processes resulted in limited attention to women's needs in conflict-affected contexts, especially those related the sexual violence. By fully incorporating gender issues in the NCEWERS, the Government through NSC has ensured that the system is more complete (NSC, 2016).

Despite all the good intentions, *Uwiano* platform has not been able to stem the trend in hate speech and other threats to peace because it cannot control social media platforms. Even the launching of the International Day for Countering Hate Speech in 2022 and the inauguration of the "Let Peace Win" campaign, did not deter hate mongers during the 2022 election in Kenya. *The Christian Science Monitor* (June 27 2022) in an expose, detailed how social media platforms such as TikTok, Twitter and Meta were being used to spread political disinformation, hate speech, and incitement against ethnic communities ahead of elections in August. In one such example, a political candidate was likened to Hitler and claimed he would attack other ethnic groups once in power. More than 130 TikTok videos featuring hate and disinformation over a six-month period were identified, which had collectively amassed more than 4 million views. With this kind of media reach, *Uwiano* finds itself incapable of stemming hate speech as a threat to peace.

2.3 Mediation as a Peacebuilding strategy.

The success of any mediation depends very much on the style and approach of the mediator. There are many approaches to mediation and at times the process may stand or fall purely on the personality of the mediator. Waehlich *et al* (2008), differentiate three types of mediation; the power-based mediation in which the mediator can apply a "sticks and carrots" method to reach a goal; the interest-based, problem-solving mediation in which the mediator focuses on generating creative options for an agreement that satisfies the underlying interests of all parties as a basis for conflict resolution; and finally the transformative, long-term mediation in which mediators intervene on different levels to change the relationship between the parties, as well as their perceptions of themselves and other parties. According to the logic of transformative mediation, conflict resolution is a long-term process, which happens through the empowerment and recognition of a broad variety of actors in conflict societies (Waehlich *et al* (2008),).

The issue of mediation is critical to Africa, given the weight of conflict and the potential for lasting peace through mediation. Govender and Ngandu (2009) argue that in the context of Africa, it is critical to take a long-term view of mediation and to develop the necessary relationships that would sustain the proceeds of mediation. Citing Mitchell Govender and Ngandu (2009) who see the product of mediation as a compromise or a settlement of issues between conflicting parties, have argued that compromise and settlements have featured greatly in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Africa due to the usually very high level of animosity and mistrust whenever conflict occurs in communities and even at the national level.

Mediation has also been carried out by African Union's regional partners, namely ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC and EAC. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mediation to bring peace to the region is captured in several protocols and documents. These include the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defense, Article 17; Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security. In Article 58 of this protocol, ECOWAS committed itself to "employ, where appropriate, good offices, conciliation, mediation and other methods of peaceful settlement of disputes." Under Article 4 of the Mechanism, the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Mediation and Security Council, and the ECOWAS Commission have specific roles to play in mediation and conflict prevention, resolution, and management in West Africa. In line with this responsibility, the president of the ECOWAS Commission deploys fact-finding and mediation missions and appoints members of the Council of Wise. The Commission established the Mediation Facilitation Division (MFD) in June 2015 to backstop mediation efforts by international organisations, such as the African Union Commission (AUC) and the United Nations (UN).

The nature of conflict in West Africa has greatly influenced the kind of mediation that ECOWAS has been able to mount. Odobo *et al* (2017) argue that the root causes of conflicts in Africa are usually traceable to the colonial era when Europeans scrambled for territories and created countries with scant regard for ethnic boundaries. However, the defining feature of West African conflict is corruption, poverty, underdevelopment, political instability, electoral violence, arms proliferation, military incursion in governance; drug trafficking, territorial disputes; the problem of leadership, resurgence of religion and ethno-religious conflict, secessionist tendencies, and the inability of the states to provide and/or guarantee security for the people.

IGAD mediation mandate is captured in the *Letter of Instrument to Amend the IGADD Charter/Agreement* signed on 21 March 1996 in Nairobi, in which the Assembly of Heads of State and Government declared that IGAD would also promote peace and stability, as well as create mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts in the region through dialogue. This new objective was translated into an IGAD Strategic Guidelines on Mediation for IGAD Mediators which came into effect in 2017 (International Crisis Group 2015). However, IGAD's conflict mediation predates the guidelines because the organisation had been mediating peace since the 1990s. South Sudan and Somalia remain good examples of the good intentions of IGAD in peacebuilding, but both countries also point to the challenges of mediating peace in a volatile situation such as South Sudan and Somalia.

The foregoing points to the value of mediation as a peacebuilding strategy, but also the serious shortcoming of the approach as a peacebuilding tool. Being a process that is dependent on the personal skills of the mediator it can be powerful and yield immediate results. This was seen in the case of Kenya in the PEV of 2008. The skills of the lead mediator, Kofi Annan brought back Kenya from the brink of total disaster. As Papagianni (2010) summarises it, mediation by third parties opens the room for a political process that allows the conflicting parties to agree on a process. In Africa and Kenya in particular, mediation has been a tool of choice for peacebuilding (Lindenmayer, 2009). However, the process is full of uncertainties and has been criticised as suitable only for short-term gains. This then introduces the issues of challenges to peacebuilding which is tackled in the next section of the literature review. Odhiambo (2014) argues that: Track Two diplomacy has two broad objectives; first of all, it aims to reduce conflict between groups and nations by improving communication and understanding. It tries to lower anger, tension, fear, and misunderstanding. It tries to humanize the face of the enemy and get one group to understand the other group's point of view.

3 Conceptual Framework

Wasike and Odhiambo (2016) discuss the role of theories in guiding the thrust of academic studies. They emphasize the importance of theories in offering compelling and incisive causal explanations with calculated precision. They buttress their argument by quoting Smith (1986) who asserts that theories play the role of predicting, prescribing, and evaluating socio-political phenomena hence they cannot be ignored.

3.1. Galtung's Theory of Peacebuilding

Galtung's thinking about peace is a long history of lifelong engagement with peace as a concept and the whole question of how the world could experience peace without any threat to that peace. In 1967, Galtung wrote that to write about peace is to write about everything and nothing. By this, Galtung attempted to express the all-encompassing nature of peace because it cannot be separated from life as we know it. Galtung began by suggesting that peace was an umbrella concept and a general expression of human desires, and that which is ultimately to be pursued (Galtung, 1967). Galtung further suggested that peace could not be given only one special meaning for to do so, then it would lose its encompassing meaning. Therefore, Galtung argues, peace cannot mean simply the absence of organized group violence, but it must respond to their lived experiences so that they can endow it with the meanings that are important to them, hence maintain its umbrella concept. Further, Galtung expounded on the idea of peace from three arguments; peace as equilibrium, peace as the absence of violence and peace as cooperation among nations and groups. The ideas have influenced peace thinking for a long time.

In 1975, Galtung coined the term "peacebuilding" in his pioneering work "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding. In this treatise, Galtung attempted to place peace in the context of a world that was changing rapidly against the backdrop of WWII which left millions dead and a world very terrified of another similar experience. In the three approaches, Galtung distinguishes the three ideas of peace starting from peacekeeping, which is the exercise of keeping physical distance between two belligerents to peacemaking which is the implementation of peace agreements without attempting to address the root causes of conflict. These two represent what Galtung called negative peace, which is hard to sustain. In Galtung's view, the ideal situation is to have positive peace because this is the only peace that is self-sustaining. Galtung therefore came up with the term peacebuilding which he defines as the process of creating self-supporting structures in society that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives conflict. This definition moves the idea of peace from the traditional peacekeeping and peacemaking both of which Galtung saw as having shortcomings in a world needing sustainable peace. Galtung's view of peace is that it must be positive for it to be sustainable.

According to Galtung, conflicts erupt because of the failure to meet basic human need, not because of scarcity but because of bad policies which introduce inequity in society and perpetuate structural violence. In this situation, peace would then represent the reduction or removal the deleterious impact of these bad policies. Peace according to Galtung has a structure which, if applied correctly should address the root causes conflict and build the way to sustainable peacebuilding. This conceptualisation of peace has not been received without criticisms. Cravo (2017) points out some omissions in Galtung's peace theory, for example the lack of clarity on what criteria is to be used in measuring equitable distribution of state resources. Galtung is also criticised for seemingly suggesting that the reasons behind violence and conflict are purely economic and political. This has not been borne out in today's where faith-based conflicts have also emerged. Juma and Odhiambo (2021), posit that the fervor for regionalism is etched in the minds of the political class globally. Some advocate for continental integration while others call for regional groupings that consist of few states whose defining criterion is territorial contiguity for the desire of sustainable peace.

In 2000, Galtung further advanced his thinking in peacebuilding by introducing the TRANSCEND method of peaceful conflict transformation. According to Galtung, the TRANSCEND method is based on the core idea that to prevent violence and develop the creative potential of a conflict, there has to be transformation. The root of the method is to understanding of conflict as incompatible goals, and incompatible parties. The separation of people and the problem to be solved is achieved through dialogue based on empathy, non-violence and joint creativity (Galtung, 2000).

3.2 Galtung's Concept of Structural Violence.

In his research paper entitled "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," (Galtung, 1969:168) argued that:

"Violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisations". Galtung, 1969:168

Galtung further argued that the inequality in the distribution of power is a clear manifestation of structural violence. Dilts *et al* (2012), posit that structural violence, is everything that hinders individuals from developing their capabilities, dispositions, or possibilities to meet their basic needs. On the other hand, Christie (1997), arguing from a human needs theory, posits that structural violence occurs when economic and political structures systematically deprive certain segments of society in meeting their basic needs, such as security, identity, well-being, and self-determination.

Structural violence produces and reproduces episodes of human rights abuse in almost all its forms because of its insidious nature. In South Africa provides an example where long after the collapse of the apartheid regime and ascendance of a democratically elected Government to power, the legacy of apartheid which perpetuated both direct and structural violence against the majority still lingers.

Taking a human rights perspective, Evans (2016) argues that the continued lack of access to land for most South Africans, post-apartheid, is, in fact structural violence in continuation of apartheid.

Structural violence has been studied in Kenya by many students of peacebuilding, for example, Roberts (2009), Murithi (2008) and Ochieng (2010). Murithi (2008), using the example of post-election violence in 2008, argues that the election seemed to have been a trigger of deep-seated structural violence in Kenya, as demonstrated by continued poor governance and corruption that has kept the majority landless, poor, unemployed and hungry. The same conclusion was arrived at by Sifuma (2011) who, in a study of post-election structural violence in Kenya argues that the post-election violence was caused by inadequate structures that did not address the plight of many Kenyans such as equitable distribution of resources, access to land, discrimination of women, entrenched corruption and impunity, marginalisation of minority communities, poverty and unemployment among the youth. The author further suggested that perpetrators of structural violence need to be held accountable for their crimes if the country is to move forward.

Mombasa County has been determined to suffer from poverty and historical injustices which can be defined as structural violence (Otieno, 2019). A rapid assessment in Mombasa County, in June 2017 under the Crime and Violence Prevention Training (CVPT) project of the Kenya Accountable Devolution Program found that Mombasa County's troubled history of conquest and subjugation, has contributed to marginalisation of the indigenous population in terms of lack of access to land, education, and citizenship rights, all of which have been defined as structural violence. These factors have greatly contributed to the current challenges around youth unemployment and associated dangers such as petty crimes and gang activity. Marginalisation and land grievances feed into the radicalisation narratives which results in the recruitment of youth into terrorism activities. In the same vein, Mtuku *et al* (2021) argues that youth criminality in Mombasa can also be viewed from a structural violence perspective where youth are also victims of marginalisation and unfavourable environments, which constrain life choices, making violent crime a frequent path. Moreover, as studies have shown, criminal justice approaches have failed these youths through inconsistent, corrupt and brutal approach by police serves (Chitembwe *et al* 2021)

3.3 Lederach's Conflict Transformation Theory

In Lederach's (2003) definition, conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationship. Lederach, cited in Miall (2001) stated that,

Conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily "see" the setting and the people in it as the "problem" and the outsider as the "answer". Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting (Lederach, 2003:15)

Lederach (1995b: 17), further argues that this process provides transformative human construction and reconstruction of social organisation and realities. Conflict transformation involves the complete change of the situations that support violence, in comparison to the other two approaches to peace that is, conflict resolution and conflict management, which do not seek to uproot conflict as it were.

Lederach (2003) likens conflict transformation with the workings of a human being who has a head, heart, arms and feet. These components are similar to those in society where different dynamics operate in what can be called "social interaction". The head, argues Lederach refers to the conceptual view of conflict, how it is thought about and therefore prepare to approach conflict. The approach to conflict is influenced by attitudes, perceptions, and orientations. According to Lederach, the capacity to envision and react positively to conflict creates the potential for transformative result. A transformational approach recognizes that conflict is a normal and a continuous dynamic within human relationships, which has ebbs and flows.

3.4 Conceptual Framework Model






Figure 1: Conceptual Model Showing interaction of variables
 Source: Researcher, 2022

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Research Design

The study adopted the descriptive survey design, because of the opportunity that the method offers for studying LPCs. This study took into consideration the versatility of the design as enabling the researcher to describe systematically and accurately the facts and characteristics of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. This study aimed to provide, as accurately as possible, the description of formal peacebuilding entities in Mombasa County and assess their ability to effectively foster a sustainable peacebuilding agenda for Mombasa County.

4.2. Study Area.

This research was done in Mombasa County. The county was selected because of the persistent land-based and ethnic conflicts that has been witnessed in the County, and which, unlike other parts of Kenya, has the potential of internationalising domestic conflict due to the emerging illicit drug trafficking and the advent of international terrorism that have both taken root in the County (Onguny, 2019; Rakodi *et al.* 2000; Botha, 2014). Mombasa County has a long history of many peacebuilding attempts amid new and old challenges, however, not much of it has been studied.




Figure 2. Map of Mombasa County

Source: GIS Expert, prepared from Kenya National Bureaus of Statistics 2021

Mombasa County lies to the east of Kenya, along the Indian Ocean Coast (Lat: -4.043740, Long: 39.658871), and is the premier trading port for Kenya and East Africa, as well as the premier destination for tourists, both local and international. In Kiswahili, Mombasa is called "Kisiwa Cha Mvita", which means "Island of War" due to the many violent changes in its administration over the years. Many nationalities have had a say on the Island at one time or another; Africans, Persians, Arabs, Portuguese and British as far back as the 6th century AD. The County has six sub-counties which also act as electoral constituencies: Mvita, Changamwe, Kisauni, Jomvu, Nyali and Likoni.

The economy of the county can be described as mixed with agriculture, manufacturing, maritime activities and tourism being the mainstay of the County. Among these, tourism which contributes to 68% of the wage employment is the leading employer generating both formal and informal employment. Others economic activities are fishing, farming of sisal, sugarcane, cashew nuts, and coconuts and livestock farming. Much of the farming of foodstuff is for subsistence at the household level. Various manufacturing firms have set up base in the County including cement companies, petroleum refining, food processing, salt production (County Government of Mombasa, 2021).

Rakodi *et. al* (2000) summarise the problem of conflict in Mombasa today as associated with urban poverty that has created the breeding ground for radicalisation, political patronage and corruption. The unresolved land issues and lack of basic services have also affected the peace of the county and built the road to youth radicalisation.

Mombasa's conflict problem cannot be divorced from the 2007/8 post-election conflict because the real drivers of the conflict have remained unresolved since Kenya's independence in 1963. These include exclusionary and oppressive rule, the use of ethnicity for political ends, inequitable distribution and access to vital resources, corruption, limited democratic space, limited rule law, and lack of respect for fundamental rights. The suffering, death, and displacement has been associated with cyclic electoral problems witnessed in Kenya since the return of multiparty politics in 1992. The post-election violence in 2007 and 2008 differed only in geographic scope and impact on lives, communities, and the economy. Ethnicity continues to play an inordinate role in Kenyan political life and the 2008 post-election violence played out largely on ethnic lines, fueled by grievances over land, privilege, and inequality (Gathiaka, 2021).

4.3 Study Population.

The study focused on the members of the 6 Mombasa Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees which was the focus of the study. At the time of field work, the population of the committees was 250 and 113 were recruited into the study. Senior Government officials in Mombasa County including Sub-county Commissioners, Security personnel and Ward Administrators totaled about 51 and 11 were recruited into the study. The study could not ascertain the exact number of youths who collaborate with the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and therefore relied on the *maskan* contacts maintained by Ward administrators. From this, 185 youths belonging to different *maskans* were identified and recruited into the study. This process also helped to identify 7 reformed youth who were included into the study as well. Similarly, to arrive at a random sample of villagers, the researcher utilised the Nyumba Kumi register at the ward level to identify and recruit 72 members of households who were recruited into the study. Through working with the Chairpersons of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, 4 representatives of NGOs that collaborate with the committees were also identified and recruited into the study. A total of 392 respondents participated in the study.

4.4 Data collection methods

Data were collected through four methods: Key Informant Interviews (KII), Focus Group Discussions, Semi-structured Questionnaires and an Observation checklist. Secondary data was also collected through the perusal of relevant documents help by Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, their partners and the National Steering Committee such as annual reports, end of project reports and minutes of meetings.

4.5 Sample Size and sampling technique.

The total sample size for the study was 392 respondents were sampled from seven categories of respondents. The study adopted different sampling technique because of the different kinds of respondents envisaged. In this study, convenience sampling was applied for the selection of the respondents from the Sub-county peacebuilding committee because of their relatively small number and availability driven by the fact that membership into these committees is voluntary and the researcher had to depend on both their availability and willingness to participate.

Convenience sampling had been used in peacebuilding studies, for example, by Palinkas *et al* (2015) point out that this method is widely used for the identification and selection of information-rich cases related to the phenomenon of interest. In this study, the senior government officials, youths and village elders were considered information-rich in terms of the work of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees.

4.6 Data Collection Procedures.

The study utilised both primary and secondary data collection techniques. Data collection was done between August 2021 and March, 2022. Out of the total study sample of 392, 113 respondents who were the core members of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees were subjected to the semi-structured questionnaire, 20 respondents were interviewed through Key Informant guides, and the balance of the respondents were interviewed in Focus Group Discussions in 32 focus groups.

4.7 Data Analysis.

The study used the identification of patterns in order to make sense of the KIIs and FGDs to supplement the information from the quantitative data. Quantitative data were analysed using version SPSS 24 and 26.

5. Findings

5.1 Peacebuilding Strategies in Mombasa County During Times of Conflict

This study sought to find out what peacebuilding strategies were used by the peacebuilding committees during times of strife. The findings of the study are presented in figure 3. Per the results, the most applied strategy during times of were; community dialogue, 31.8% (N=35), followed by ad hoc public meetings, 26.6% (N=30), then online community sensitisation, 22% (N=25) and lastly peace *Barazas*, 19.5% (N=23).




Figure 3. Strategies for maintaining peace during conflict in Mombasa County

Source:Field Data, 2021

5.1.1 Community Dialogue

Community dialogue is a common feature in Africa and has been applied in many issues that impact society. Community dialogue can be defined as a forum that draws participants from different sections of a community to create the opportunity for exchanging information and perspectives, clarifying viewpoints, and developing solutions to issues of interest to the community. The main outcome of community dialogue is to find common ground and increase the constituency base and voices so that an issue can enjoy a broad consensus. Bercovitch (2009) argues that dialogue is one of the approaches that is mostly used and cuts across all other approaches to conflict resolution and transformation. Dialogues are not debating which tend to place people on opposite sides of issues and foster adversarial relations. In dialogue, people are supposed to speak openly and listen respectfully and attentively. Dialogue excludes attack and defense and avoids derogatory attributions based on assumptions about the motives, meanings, or character of others (UNDP, 2016). According to Chitembwe & Odhiambo (2021), a renewed movement to fight for the self-determination of citizens in the coastal region emerged in the counties of Mombasa and Kwale in 2008 when the MRC regained traction, calling for secession from Kenya. Among the 32 classes that were prohibited by the Ministry of Internal Security in Gazette Notice 125855 was the MRC hence there was a need for dialogue.

In this study, focus group discussions were held with community leaders on the peacebuilding strategies and most were quick to point to community dialogue;

We have community dialogue, peer-peer, women to women dialogues, also we have parental dialogues, and also forums where we mainly focus on women who have been affected by violence, we go around school talk to the headteacher and get to know the challenges children face while in schools and give them recommendations. We also do one on one counselling to parents who feel they have too much concerning parental responsibility, we also have *Barazas*, we also do civic education, we also do awareness on equitable sharing of resources, and we also promote cohesion between police and youth through tournaments. We also take youth to do general clean up exercise at the police station. (FGD session with Women leaders, Nyali, December 9 2021)

5.1.2 Ad Hoc Peace Meetings

Respondents indicated that ad hoc peace meetings were also used during times of conflict. Ad hoc peacebuilding meetings are those that take place without prior planning to address an immediate problem. Respondents did mention times when warring youths would be arrested by the police and immediately. An issue that was discussed at length was the fire-fighting role of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees.

A respondent added to the above sentiments by stating what it takes for the DPC to actually regain peace in a community.

Mostly what they do is to negotiate with members of the community, especially when there are inter-communal conflicts. They set up meeting where they meet with the disputing group and do conflict resolution through negotiation and most of the time as security actors, we don't move in because it works, they will talk with the disputants and give a report that they have resolved the issue and the community has resolved to live harmoniously. It is better than when we go as security because we go to enforce certain laws which at times is lose-win but with them they make sure it is a win-win situation (Interview with DCC Nyali Subcounty on 30th, Septemeber, 2021).

5.1.3 Community Sensitisation by Social Media (WhatsApp Groups)

The world over, social media has become the dominant tool for communication, providing several platforms such as Twitter, WhatsApp, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, LinkedIn etc. This has been made possible with the widespread availability and use of mobile smartphones through which audio-visual information can be transmitted. Smartphones can browse the Internet and run software programs like a computer. Smartphones use a touch screen to allow users to interact with them. Odera (2013) in examining the role of social media in Kenya argued that the penetration and popularity of social media among the Kenyans highlighted its potential to be a great tool to foster democratic dialogue and freedom of expression. However, owing to the unrestricted nature of the internet and social media, it can be used to circulate misleading information by unscrupulous people to destabilise the peace. For example, Denskus (2019) exposes the problem of how Facebook has become a platform for sectarian violence in Sri Lanka, fueled by misinformation. Moreover, the power of the corporations behind these platforms, for example, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, or messaging applications, are unregulated.

In Kenya, the most visible use of social media platform for peacebuilding has been the *Uwiano* Platform which has been in operation since 2008. The *Uwiano* Platform for Peace was used as an early warning media strategy to prevent electoral violence around the 2010 constitutional referendum and the 2013 elections. *Uwiano* is a Swahili word meaning cohesion.

Among the strategies applied by the Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in their peacebuilding efforts is the use of social media techniques to reach out to the community. It was the third most applied technique mentioned by 22% of the respondents. During the focus group discussion, a respondent summarised the use of social media (WhatsApp) as follows as a good thing that could advance the cause of peacebuilding.

5.1.4 Peace Barazas

Kenya's *Barazas* are governed by the Public Participation Bill of 2018 which provides a general framework for effective citizen involvement on issues affecting them such as development, crime, health, and security. The Bill provides for public participation as a requirement in any decisions that will affect them as individuals, communities or organisations. The advantage of public *Barazas* is the participatory nature of proceedings when shaping public policy at the local level (Mutegi and Muna, 2021). By their very nature, *Barazas* are open and people talk freely about the issues they feel most strongly about. *Barazas* act as a forum for not only eliciting frank discussion of pertinent abs curret issues but also also a point of reference for for future action. As indicated by one respondent;

When we get out of chiefs *Barazas*, we go back home and combine with other village elders, call villagers, and tell them what is happening in the community, we do tell parents to speak to their children because if something happens to them no one is to be blamed but them, Villagers inform us on suspected criminals and we respond effectively. (FGD with Women's Group, Mvita, Nov 11, 2021)

Apart from peace *Barazas*, community sensitization, *ad hoc* peace meetings, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees gather intelligence, which is often used by the police to apprehend criminals in the communities. The role of intelligence gathering was considered of critical importance because the police rely on such information to act against criminal elements of the society.

5.2. Peacebuilding Education

The study sought to establish whether Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees conduct peacebuilding education in Mombasa county. The results are contained in figure 4.




Figure 4. Conduct of Regular Peacebuilding Education
 Source: field data, (2022)

The overall goal of the Peace Education Programme is to promote peaceful co-existence among members of the school community hence contributing to peace and national cohesion in the country. The programme also enhances the capacity of the education sector to promote peaceful coexistence through conflict-sensitive policies and programming. A national monitoring exercise conducted in 2010 revealed that peace education was not being effectively taught due to a lack of adequate capacity among teachers. In some of the schools, life skills education, which is one of the main carrier subjects, was not taught as it is not examined in national examinations. Peace education is also taught in other educational institutions in Kenya. Kenyan Quakers, (Friends Mission) a religious institution which runs schools in Western Kenya obtained Kenya Government authorisation to develop a peace education curriculum in 2009. The curriculum which bases its instruction on facilitating, and not telling focuses on building the capacity of the learner to work with others to acquire behavioural knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values that will enhance peaceful co-existence.

The study found out that Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees held regular peacebuilding education in the county. The regularity of the peacebuilding education was not defined because at any one time there is always a workshop or a seminar on peacebuilding going on in the County. Focus group discussions confirmed that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees do indeed carry out peacebuilding education. The effectiveness of the the peacebuilding education program therefore remains to be determined but as a strategy, sub-county eacebuilding committees do recognise the value of the same.

5.3 Collaborative efforts –working with other peace stakeholders in Mombasa County

The study sought to assess the steps taken by to collaborate with peace stakeholders in Mombasa County. The results are illustrated in figure 5.




Figure 5. Collaboration with other peacebuilding Stakeholders

Source: Field Data, 2022

As illustrated in figure 5.4 above, out of 113, 5.31% (N=6) strongly disagreed with the inquiry, 9.74% (N=11), disagreed, and 2.66% (N=3) were undecided. On the other hand, Additionally, 59.29% (N=67) agreed with the inquiry while 23.01% (N=26) strongly agreed with the question. A cumulative 82.3% (N=93) agreed with the question thereby confirming that indeed Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees do work with other partners.

The Terms of Reference (ToRs) for Kenya peacebuilding committees requires them to work in collaboration with others peace stakeholders in the peacebuilding agenda of the country. The first two responsibilities that the guidelines assign to the local peace committees are; 1) to network with other Peace Forums/Committees and organisations to enhance harmonious relationships and; 2) in consultation with Security and Intelligence Committees and other stakeholders to oversee the implementation of peace agreements and/or contracts. In essence, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are not seen as independent organs at the same level as the National Steering Committee (NSC) but as part of the team that works on peacebuilding wherever they are. In our case, it is Mombasa county. The study also sought to find out who the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were collaborating with and what the collaboration entailed. Table 1 shows the most mentioned collaborators with the DPC and what areas they collaborate in.

Table 1: Entities that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborate with

	Collaboration partners	Nature of collaboration
1	Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI)	Human Rights
2	Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE)	Peacebuilding Conflict Mitigation
3	HAKI Africa	Peace and security
4	Nyumba Kumi	Monitoring of security threats
5	National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)	Election management Peace development
6	Chiefs	Dispute settlement
7	County Government of Mombasa	Coordination of security matters
8	JUHUDI	Peace Development

Source: Field Data, 2022

Many entities are working in peacebuilding in Mombasa County, ranging from NGOs, CSOs, Governmental and even international organisations, but the most mentioned are summarised in table 1. Further analysis of the data seemed to indicate that the bulk of the collaboration was in the areas that support the primary function of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. However, the study found that there are emergent areas of collaboration that, though only nuanced in the National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2015), have formed significant areas of collaboration in the county peace agenda. These are; Human Rights and Elections Management. The study sought to establish where the weight of the collaboration lay, and the results are presented in figure 5. There are the areas where Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees draw their support from.




Figure 5. Areas of collaboration
 Source: field Data, 2022

Per the results in figure 5, the respondents agreed that the largest area of collaboration with peacebuilding stakeholders was in: peacebuilding, 29.2% (N=32), followed by conflict mitigation, 18.6% (N=21), next was peace and security, 14.2% (N=16), followed by monitoring of security threats, 11.5% (N=13), then dispute settlement 9.7% (N=11). The last two areas of collaboration, human rights, 9.8% (N=11) and elections management, 7.0% (N=9) are not specified in the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees ToR but they are important because of the nature of the politic of Mombasa County. These last two issues are discussed in greater detail.

Some of the clearest collaborations that the DPC enjoy are with grassroots NGOs such as JUHUDI which spans many peace and security issues. As a respondent said;

we have been working very closely with the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and through the office of the county commissioner...they have a very big role to play because they are intermediaries between the community and the state organs, the security apparatus and when it comes to matters of conflicts and sometimes they even play the role which is supposed to be played by the area chief as a mediator or the leadership within the provision of administration, however, in their linkage they have a lot of mutual trust from the community because community perceive security organs to be of their threat on one angle and there is no good co-operation, however, through the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees they are there to mitigate that gap and make sure that the communities can see the security apparatus with a different eye. (KII with NGO representative, Kisauni, February 21 2022).

The study found out that the close collaboration and cooperation existing between the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and the civil society in the County is because many members of the DPC came into the peacebuilding entities via NGOs in which they are members or somehow associated. Some of the NGOs have been officially coopted into the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. At the same time, just one alliance such as the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) is a huge organisation that brings many faith-based organisations under one umbrella for peacebuilding. CICC is made up of; Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), Hindu Council of Kenya (HCK), The Catholic Church (KEC), Archdiocese of Mombasa, and Diocese of Malindi, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), the Organization of African Instituted Churches, the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya (EAK) and Africa Traditional Religions. By working with CICC, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees will be partnering with almost all faith-based programs in the County.

6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The most common strategies or approaches for peacebuilding that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees used were ; individual and community dialogue; community mobilisation through theatre and dance (including cultural festivals); peace *Barazas*, community walks; youth engagement and ad hoc meetings. Much of the peacebuilding work depended on what threat to peace was foremost at the time of response. That Peace *Barazas* seemed most preferred perhaps because of the number of people who attend and the fact that Baraza resolutions are usually binding and enforceable.

The study also established that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborated with a wide range of other stakeholders including; Government agencies (such as NSC), NGOs, and both local and international and religious organisations. The study found out that social media has been used as one of the peacebuilding tools employed by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The use of short message services (SMS) and WhatsApp has greatly increased the capacity of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to communicate. Yet this effective and cheap means of communication is hampered by the non-funding of committee members' communication needs.

7. Recommendations

To ensure that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can foster sustainable peacebuilding, their strategies need to gradually shift towards those that address the underlying causes of conflict in Mombasa County. This study also observed that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have opportunities for fostering sustainable peacebuilding through public peace education and acting as the honest broker among other peacebuilding stakeholders.

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